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The Substantial Weight Test: A Proposal to 
Resolve the Circuits’ Disparate Interpretations of 
Materiality Under the False Claims Act* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The False Claims Act (FCA)1 is a federal statute that imposes civil 
liability on any person who presents or causes to be presented a false or 
fraudulent monetary claim for disbursement of United States 
governmental funds.2  While some form of the Act has been in force 
since the Civil War,3 courts are still unsure of how to interpret the 
widely-used statute.  In particular, courts have been wildly inconsistent 
regarding materiality under the FCA.  Before Congress passed the Fraud 
Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA), materiality was not an 
express element of the statute,4 and as a result, some circuits declined to 
recognize materiality as an element of an FCA claim.5  Other circuits 
held that materiality was implicitly required and should be considered.6  
Those circuits finding materiality as an element of an FCA claim were 
and remain split on what test applies to determine materiality under the 
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 1. 31 U.S.C.A. §§ 3729–3733 (West Supp. 2009); 18 U.S.C.A § 287 (West Supp. 2009). 
 2. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729. 
 3. Daniel Engelberg, Nineteenth Survey of White Collar Crime: False claims, 41 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 527, 527 (2004). 
 4. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West Supp. 2009). 
 5. Carl Pacini & Michael Bret Hood, The Role of Qui Tam Actions under the False Claims Act 
in Preventing and Deterring Fraud Against Government, 15 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 273, 294 (2007) 
(citing James B. Helmer, Jr. & Julie Webster Popham, Materiality and the False Claims Act, 71 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 839, 841–42 (2003)).  See also United States ex rel. Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 
192 F.3d 402, 415 (3d Cir. 1999) (casting doubt on whether materiality is an element under the FCA, 
but declining to resolve the issue). 
 6. See United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. 
Ct. 1524 (2009); United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 
428, 441–42 (6th Cir. 2005); United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 
1453, 1459 (4th Cir. 1997). 
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FCA.7  Although the United States Supreme Court has provided a 
general definition of “materiality,”—“a false statement is material if it 
has a ‘natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the 
decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed’”8—the 
definition has failed to provide guidance to the circuit courts in the 
context of the FCA.  As a result of FERA, the FCA now defines 
“material” in § 3729(b)(4) as “having a natural tendency to influence, or 
be capable of influencing, the payment or receipt of money or property,”9 
which is clearly similar to the definition provided by the Supreme Court.  
Some circuits adopted a test from the Court’s definition called the natural 
tendency test, which finds that the materiality of a false statement turns 
on “whether the false statement has a natural tendency to influence 
agency action or is capable of influencing agency action.”10  Other 
circuits have applied an outcome determinative test, which requires a 
showing that the alleged fraudulent actions had “the purpose and effect 
of causing the United States to pay out money it is not obligated to pay, 
or those actions which intentionally deprive the United States of money 
it is lawfully due . . . .”11 
To resolve the discrepancies in finding liability under the FCA, 
circuit courts should all apply the same elements and the same tests to 
alleged false or fraudulent claims.  Based on the legislative intent, 
common law of general fraud, and FERA, materiality is an element of a 
civil FCA claim.  Because of the statute’s unique remedial-punitive 
nature, courts should apply a more restrictive test than the natural 
tendency test12 and a less restrictive test than the outcome determinative 
test.13  The test should be a substantial weight test: while the government 
need not actually have paid the false claim, the alleged false statement 
must be the type often considered by the government in the decision-
making process, and its effect must be given substantial weight in the 
government’s decision to pay the claim.  Courts could apply this test, and 
thus the FCA, more uniformly and remain consistent with the general 
                                                     
 7. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665, 675–76 (5th Cir. 2002) (describing 
the circuit split and the different tests applied in the circuits), aff’d on reh’g, 326 F.3d 669 (5th Cir. 
2003) (en banc). 
 8. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 
506, 509 (1995)). The Court in Neder did not address an FCA claim; instead, the underlying claims 
were tax fraud, federal mail fraud, wire fraud, and bank fraud.  Id. at 6. 
 9. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(4) (West Supp. 2009). 
 10. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d at 1459 (citing United States v. Norris, 749 F.2d 
1116, 1122 (4th Cir. 1984)). 
 11. Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 12. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 13. See infra Part III.B.2. 
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definition of materiality set forth by the Supreme Court, FERA, and the 
purpose of the FCA as set forth in the legislative history. 
To support these conclusions, this Note will analyze the legislative 
intent and statutory history of the FCA in Part II.  Part III will describe 
the current status of the circuit splits with regard to the role of materiality 
in determining liability under the FCA.  Part IV will set forth an analysis 
and a clearer description of the proposed substantial weight test. 
II. LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT 
The FCA was enacted “in 1863 to combat rampant fraud and 
corruption in the sale of supplies and provisions to the Union army 
during the Civil War.”14  The FCA’s original civil penalties provided for 
“double the amount of damages suffered by the United States as a result 
of a false claim, plus a forfeiture of two thousand dollars for each false 
claim submitted.”15  Because the primary purpose of these penalties was 
to provide restitution to the government for money it had been deprived 
of by fraud, the statute was intended to be a remedial one.16  In 
interpreting the FCA, the Supreme Court has agreed that it is remedial in 
nature.  “We think the chief purpose of the [Act’s civil penalties] was to 
provide for restitution to the government of money taken from it by 
fraud, and that the device of double damages plus a specific sum was 
chosen to make sure that the government would be made completely 
whole.”17 
The Supreme Court, in United States v. Bramblett, explained that the 
original statute penalized presentment for payment or approval of false 
claims upon or against the government and any false statement made “for 
the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in obtaining, the approval or payment 
of such claim.”18  A statement or record under the FCA is a false 
assertion made as a part of the claim.19  In United States v. McNinch, the 
Supreme Court suggested that a “claim” under the FCA is a demand for 
money or property that induces the government to disburse funds or 
“otherwise suffer immediate financial detriment.”20  If the false statement 
                                                     
 14. Engelberg, supra note 3, at 527. 
 15. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5273. 
 16. Engelberg, supra note 3, at 528. 
 17. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 314 (1976) (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus 
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1943)), superseded by statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). 
 18. 348 U.S. 503, 505 (1955), overruled by Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995). 
 19. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 
2009). 
 20. 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958).  See also 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2) (West Supp. 2009). 
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is material or it “has a natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of 
influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was 
addressed,” it makes the claim false.21  In its original form, the FCA 
protected the government from both false claims and false statements 
until 1948 when Congress split the FCA into two different statutes.22  
Currently, the FCA contains both civil23 and criminal24 provisions.  This 
Note discusses only the civil provision. 
As the FCA evolved, it was used more generally to protect 
governmental funds and property from false or fraudulent claims.25  In 
fact, Congress has provided the FCA as the exclusive remedy for 
recovering damages from all attempts to cause the government to pay out 
money as a result of false or fraudulent claims.26  The Supreme Court 
stated that in enacting the FCA, “Congress wrote expansively, meaning 
to reach all types of fraud, without qualification, that might result in 
financial loss to the Government.”27  The FCA covers all claims to 
governmental money, even if a claimant does not have a direct 
connection to the government.28 
Essentially, there are two actionable claims under the FCA: a 
standard claim and a reverse claim.29  A standard false claim is an 
attempt to receive payment from the government for false or fraudulent 
claims.30  A reverse false claim is an attempt to conceal, avoid, or 
                                                     
 21. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999) (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 
506, 509 (1995)). 
 22. Engelberg, supra note 3, at 527 n.3.  See Bramblett, 348 U.S. at 505–06 (explaining that the 
originally enacted statute penalized presentment for payment or approval of false claims upon or 
against the government and false statements made for the purpose of obtaining, or aiding in 
obtaining, the approval or payment of such claims). 
 23. §§ 3729–3733. 
 24. 18 U.S.C.A. § 287 (West Supp. 2009). 
 25. Engelberg, supra note 3, at 527.  See also United States v. Maher, 582 F.2d 842, 847–48 
(4th Cir. 1978) (indicating that the FCA’s purpose “is to assure the integrity of claims and vouchers 
submitted to the government”); Engelberg, supra note 3, at 527 n.3 (citing United States v. Gilliland, 
312 U.S. 86, 93 (1941)) (stating the statutory language and history reveals Congress’s intent “to 
protect the authorized functions of governmental departments and agencies from the perversion 
which might result from the deceptive practices”). 
 26. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 
456 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 27. Id. (citing Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 129 (2003) 
(internal quotations omitted)). 
 28. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729 (West Supp. 2009).  This assertion is further supported by the Senate 
report in which Senator Leahy indicates that presentment to the government directly is not an 
element of an FCA claim and the FCA only requires that the claim be paid by governmental funds 
rather than directly to the claimant by the government.  S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), reprinted 
in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 437–38. 
 29. § 3729(a). 
 30. § 3729(a)(1)(A). 
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decrease an obligation owed to the government by filing false 
documents.31  The FCA imposes liability when 
(1) a person presents a claim for payment or approval or to decrease an 
obligation owed to the Government; (2) the claim is false or fraudulent; 
and (3) the person acted knowingly, defined as actual knowledge of the 
information, or with deliberate ignorance or reckless disregard of the 
truth or falsity of the information.32 
Liability also attaches when a person “knowingly makes [or] uses . . . a 
false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”33 
In 1986, Congress responded to an estimated thirty percent increase 
in contractor fraud cases.34  At this time, it was estimated that the United 
States was losing more than fifty billion dollars a year to false claims in 
all areas of government.35  Congress wanted to deter fraud against the 
government and took the opportunity to clarify the courts’ confusion on 
the purpose and application of the FCA.36  Before 1986, courts were 
declaring that the FCA was penal in nature and that the government must 
prove its case by clear and convincing evidence to recover.37  Because 
Congress was “[f]rustrated with courts mandating higher burdens of 
proof for false claims,”38 it also intended to reinforce its remedial 
purpose and to send a strong message to the courts that the FCA should 
be construed broadly.39  In the 1986 amendments, Congress clarified that 
the government’s burden of proof for an FCA claim was by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the lowest standard.40  Additionally, 
Congress recognized that the “growing pervasiveness of fraud 
necessitates modernization of the Government’s primary litigative 
tool.”41 
                                                     
 31. § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
 32. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 
451 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing § 3729(b)). 
 33. § 3729(a)(1)(B). 
 34. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267. 
 35. Id. at 3. 
 36. Id. at 7. 
 37. Id.  See also United States v. Ueber, 299 F.2d 310, 314 (6th Cir. 1962), superseded by 
statute 31 U.S.C. § 3731(c) (2006) (noting that the government must prove its FCA case by clear and 
convincing evidence). 
 38. Gregory G. Brooker, The False Claims Act: Congress Giveth and the Courts Taketh Away, 
25 HAMLINE L. REV. 373, 380 (2002) (footnote omitted). 
 39. Engelberg, supra note 3, at 528.  See also S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1 (stating that the basic 
purpose of the 1986 amendments was to make the FCA a more useful tool against fraud in modern 
times). 
 40. Brooker, supra note 38, at 380. 
 41. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 
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Prior to the 1986 amendments, the FCA provided for double 
damages and a maximum two thousand dollar civil penalty.42  The 
Supreme Court discussed this provision in 1976 and concluded “that the 
device of double damages plus a specific sum was chosen to make sure 
that the government would be made completely whole.”43  One of the 
most significant changes Congress instituted with its 1986 amendments 
was the increase from double damages to treble damages.44  Due to this 
change, the Act took on a slight aspect of punishment.45  However, a fact 
finder’s primary duty had not changed: “if it finds liability, its instruction 
is to return a verdict for actual damages,” which a court may then 
multiply.46  In addition to the change to treble damages, the amendments 
also increased the civil penalties from two thousand dollars to “not less 
than $5,000 and not more than $10,000.”47  While it is arguable that the 
increase may have been due to Congress’s desire to deter fraud against 
the government, the increase is most likely attributable to inflation.48 
The amendments served their intended purpose and produced their 
intended effect.49  Since their enactment in 1986, claims under the FCA 
have been filed “in virtually all areas where governmental money is 
spent.”50  Some well-known or recent examples of FCA violations 
include healthcare fraud,51 submissions to the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (FEMA) of false proof of loss claims after 
destruction caused by hurricanes,52 bid-rigging and defective pricing on 
                                                                                                                       
444 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 2). 
 42. United States v. Mackby, 339 F.3d 1013, 1019 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 43. Id. (quoting United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 314 (1976)). 
 44. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 17. 
 45. Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler, 538 U.S. 119, 131–32 (2003). 
 46. Id. at 132. 
 47. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a) (West Supp. 2009). 
 48. Two thousand dollars in 1863 was equal to approximately $17,850 in 1986.  See The 
Inflation Calculator, http://www.westegg.com/inflation (last visited Oct. 1, 2009).  Based on this 
result, the punitive impact of the forfeiture per false claim has, in effect, decreased. 
 49. Engelberg, supra note 3, at 528. 
 50. Id.  See also All About Qui Tam, Common Types of Fraud Against the Government, 
http://www.allaboutquitam.orgfca_common.shtml (last visited Aug. 26, 2009) (discussing the areas 
where the FCA could be used to combat fraud, including public works projects, federal government 
construction, research programs, customs, environmental clean-up programs, loan guarantees, 
agricultural subsidies, municipal bonds, and underpayment of oil and gas royalties on government-
leased land). 
 51. Stuart M. Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: Eroding Confidentiality in 
Federal Health Care Law, 51 ALA. L. REV. 163, 170 (1999) (stating annual criminal convictions for 
health care fraud numbered only ninety in 1992, but exceeded 300 by 1997).  See also United States 
v. Cabrera-Diaz, 106 F. Supp. 2d 234, 235–36 (D.P.R. 2000) (involving alleged false claims 
submitted to Medicare for anesthesia services). 
 52. Pacini & Hood, supra note 5, at 275. 
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governmentally funded housing projects,53 false certifications for 
entitlement to governmental benefits,54 and billing twice for the same 
work.55 
In early 2009 in the “midst of [the United States’s] most serious 
economic crisis since the Great Depression,”56 Congress leapt into action 
with Senator Leahy at the helm to once again amend the FCA.57  While 
FERA’s main aim was to “reinvigorate [the government’s] capacity to 
investigate and prosecute the kinds of financial frauds that have so 
severely undermined our financial markets,”58 Congress was also 
concerned about fraud and abuse of more than one trillion dollars in 
stimulus funds.59  It declared the FCA as “[o]ne of the most successful 
tools for combating waste and abuse in Government spending” and is 
“used to recover funds lost to fraud and abuse.”60 
With the 2009 amendments, Congress sought to clarify and correct 
interpretations of the FCA in Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. 
Sanders61 and United States ex rel. Totten v. Bombardier Corp.62  
Congress sought to eliminate the requirement created in Allison Engine 
Co. that “‘a defendant must intend that the Government itself pay the 
claim.’”63  This Supreme Court decision interpreted the FCA to require 
an element of intent that was not originally intended by Congress in 
passing the law.64  Additionally, it created a defense for entities that did 
not seek to defraud the government directly, but sought to defraud the 
government indirectly to receive governmental funds.65  To clarify that 
the FCA carries with it no requirement of intent on behalf of the 
defendant, FERA eliminated the phrase “to get” from former § 
3729(a)(2) and “defraud the Government by getting a false or fraudulent 
                                                     
 53. United States v. Ehrlich, 643 F.2d 634, 635 (9th Cir. 1981) (involving intentional 
overstatement of construction costs on a federally insured mortgage on a housing project). 
 54. Pacini & Hood, supra note 5, at 275. 
 55. Al Munford, Inc. v. United States, 34 Fed. Cl. 62, 63–64 (1995), vacated, 86 F.3d 1178 
(1996) (involving allegations that a construction company submitted dual claims for building and 
repairing wash racks at Fort McClellan, Alabama). 
 56. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 2 (2009) reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 431. 
 57. Id. at 10. 
 58. Id. at 3. 
 59. Id. at 10. 
 60. Id. 
 61. 128 S. Ct. 2123 (2008). 
 62. 380 F.3d 488 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
 63. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (quoting Allison Engine Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2128). 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
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claim allowed or paid” from former § 3729(a)(3).66  By passing FERA, 
Congress also sought to eliminate the presentment element created by the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in Totten.67  This 
decision also created a defense for individuals presenting claims to 
government grantees or contractors even though the claims were paid 
with government funds.68  As a result, Congress removed the 
“presentment clause” from the statute and amended the definition of 
“claim.”69 
Additionally, although Congress did not change the civil penalties 
that can be assessed under the FCA with the 2009 amendments, it did 
create a provision to adjust them for inflation.70  With all the detailed 
changes to the FCA under FERA, the main purpose was to enforce and, 
once again, reinstate the broad, remedial purpose of the Act, which 
Congress considered particularly important in this economic climate with 
the disbursement of billions of dollars in government stimulus funds.71 
III. CURRENT STATUS OF THE CIRCUITS ON MATERIALITY IN THE 
CONTEXT OF THE FCA 
Although Congress enacted amendments in 1986 and 2009 to reduce 
ambiguity in applying the FCA,72 courts are still divided on how to 
interpret the statute.73  Prior to the 2009 amendments, some circuits 
interpreted the FCA to include a materiality requirement, others did 
not.74  The Supreme Court did not directly resolve the issue.  However, 
in the summer of 2008, the Supreme Court examined a similar issue 
under former 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).75  Former § 3729(a)(2) imposed 
liability on a person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made 
                                                     
 66. Id. at 12. 
 67. Id. at 10. 
 68. Id. at 10–11. 
 69. Id. at 11; 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2) (West Supp. 2009). 
 70. § 3729(a)(1). 
 71. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10. 
 72. Id.; S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5272. 
 73. See United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 288 F.3d 665, 675–76 (5th Cir. 2002) 
(describing the circuit split and the different tests applied in the circuits), aff’d on reh’g, 326 F.3d 
669 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 74. See Pacini & Hood, supra note 5, at 294 (2007) (citing James B. Helmer, Jr. & Julie 
Webster Popham, Materiality and the False Claims Act, 71 U. CIN. L. REV. 839, 841–42 (2003)).  
See also United States ex rel. Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 192 F.3d 402, 415 (3d Cir. 1999) 
(casting doubt on whether materiality is an element under the FCA, but declining to resolve the 
issue). 
 75. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2125 (2008). 
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or used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid 
or approved by the Government.”76  The Court held that “a plaintiff must 
prove that the defendant intended that the false statement be material to 
the Government’s decision to pay or approve the false claim,”77 which 
created an intent element for FCA claims under § 3729(a)(2).  The Court 
required that for a defendant to be liable under this section, he must have 
subjectively intended the false statement to be material to the 
government’s decision to pay the claim.78  The creation of this additional 
requirement was one of the main reasons Congress passed the 2009 
amendments.79 
Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders did not resolve 
the dispute as to whether materiality is an independent element of an 
FCA claim, nor did it examine whether false statements must be material 
from the government’s point of view when it objectively decides whether 
or not to pay a claim.80  However, Congress likely resolved the dispute 
over whether materiality is an element of an FCA claim when it removed 
the intent element from former § 3729(a)(2) by replacing “to get” with 
the phrase “material to.”81  Congress defined material as “having a 
natural tendency to influence, or be capable of influencing, the payment 
or receipt of money or property.”82  Congress also added a materiality 
requirement to a reverse claim brought under § 3729(a)(1)(G).83 
Therefore, the issue as to whether materiality is an element of § 
3729(a)(1)(B) and (G) of the FCA has seemingly been resolved.  
However, Congress failed to resolve the issue of whether materiality is 
an element of an FCA claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A).  Additionally, the 
issue remains as to the proper test to determine if a statement is indeed 
material.  Many circuits have taken the vague definition of the Supreme 
Court in Neder v. United States,84 which is now the definition within the 
Act,85 and turned it into an even more ambiguous test called the natural 
                                                     
 76. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 
2009). 
 77. Allison Engine Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2125. 
 78. Id. 
 79. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10–11 (2009) reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 437–38. 
 80. See generally Allison Engine Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2125. 
 81. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12. 
 82. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(4) (West Supp. 2009). 
 83. § 3729(a)(1)(G). 
 84. 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999).  In general, a false statement is material if it has a “natural tendency 
to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was 
addressed.”  Id. (citing United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)). 
 85. § 3729(b)(4). 
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tendency test.86  Other circuits have applied a more rigid and restrictive 
outcome determinative test for finding materiality under the statute.87  
Neither test seems to be supported by Congressional intent or the plain 
meaning of the statute. 
A. Materiality as an Element of the FCA 
Prior to the 2009 amendments, several circuit courts found or 
suggested that a civil action brought under the FCA requires a showing 
of materiality.88  These courts analyzed the statutory language, legislative 
history, and underlying purpose of the law for implicit support of an 
element of materiality even though there was no express requirement in 
the FCA.89  While the 2009 amendments creating an express requirement 
of materiality make the circuits’ findings of implicit materiality 
somewhat moot regarding § 3729(a)(1)(B) and (G), the analysis is 
important for three basic reasons.  First, as support for the definition and 
requirement of materiality, Congress cited Neder v. United States and 
United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Management 
Group, Inc. without giving any additional reasoning for adding the 
element.90  Presumably, Congress intended to adopt the Sixth Circuit’s 
reasoning in Medshares Management Group for adding an element of 
materiality to the statute.  Second, Congress’s basis for adding the 
requirement is important in establishing what test should apply to 
determine whether the element has been met.  Third, circuit courts have 
found that materiality is required under § 3729(a)(1)(A); however, 
Congress failed to make materiality an express requirement under that 
subsection.91  Therefore, the issue remains as to whether materiality 
should be an element of a § 3729(a)(1)(A) claim. 
                                                     
 86. United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1171 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S.Ct. 
1524 (2009); United States ex rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc., 465 F.3d 1189, 1200 (10th Cir. 2006); 
United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 445–446 
(6th Cir. 2005); United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1459 
(4th Cir. 1997). 
 87. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001); Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 
F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998); United States ex rel. Bidani v. Lewis, 264 F. Supp. 2d 612, 615 (N.D. 
Ill. 2003). 
 88. See Medshares Mgmt. Group, 400 F.3d at 442; United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 
326 F.3d 669, 679 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc); United States ex rel. Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 
317 F.3d 883, 887 (8th Cir. 2003); Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 183 F.3d 730, 732 (7th Cir. 
1999); United States ex rel. Berge, 104 F.3d at 1459; United States v. TDC Mgmt. Corp., 24 F.3d 
292, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1994). 
 89. See, e.g., Medshares Mgmt. Group, 400 F.3d at 442. 
 90. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 439. 
 91. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A) (West Supp. 2009). 
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1. Prior to the 2009 Amendments, Circuit Courts Held Materiality as an 
Implicit Element of the FCA 
In United States v. Wells, the Supreme Court established a three-step 
framework by which courts should interpret statutes: (1) a natural read of 
the full text; (2) the common-law meaning of the statutory terms; and (3) 
the statutory and legislative history.92  The Sixth Circuit in Medshares 
Management Group used this framework to determine that there is a 
materiality requirement under the FCA.93  Specifically the court stated, 
“[a]pplying the Wells framework to the FCA, we conclude that false 
statements or conduct must be material to the false or fraudulent claim to 
hold a person civilly liable under the FCA.”94 
a. The First Step of the Wells Framework and the FCA 
In applying the first step of the Wells framework, the court found that 
a natural reading of the statute supported the presence of a materiality 
element under the FCA.95  The court analyzed former 31 U.S.C. § 
3729(a)(1), (2), and (7),96 now 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), and (G).97  
“Under the first subsection, the FCA imposes liability on ‘[a]ny person 
who knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or 
employee of the United States Government . . . a false or fraudulent 
claim for payment or approval.’”98  Claim was defined by former § 
3729(c) as “any request or demand . . . for money or property . . . [where] 
the United States Government provides any portion of the money or 
property which is requested or demanded.”99  Thus, the court concluded 
that liability under the FCA does not arise only because the claim 
includes a false statement, but “the claim itself must be false or 
                                                     
 92. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 490–92 (1997). 
 93. 400 F.3d at 442. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 442–43. 
 97. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A), (B), (G) (West Supp. 2009). 
 98. Medshares Mgmt. Group, 400 F.3d at 442 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006)). After 
the 2009 amendments, this subsection states “any person who . . . knowingly presents, or causes to 
be presented, a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”  31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(A) 
(West Supp. 2009). 
 99. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(c) (2006).  After the 2009 amendments, claim is now defined in relevant 
part as “any request or demand . . . for money or property . . . [where] the United States Government 
provides or has provided any portion of the money or property requested or demanded.”  31 
U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(2) (West Supp. 2009). 
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fraudulent.”100  “A false statement within a claim can only serve to make 
the entire claim itself fraudulent if that statement is material to the 
request or demand for money or property.”101 
Former subsection two imposed liability on a person who 
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or 
statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or approved by the 
Government.”102  As the Fifth Circuit stated, “[t]he express connection of 
a false statement with ‘getting’ a false claim paid is tantamount to 
requiring that the false statement be material to the payment decision.”103  
Essentially, one cannot get a false or fraudulent claim paid unless the 
false statement is important or material to the government’s decision-
making process. 
Finally, the court analyzed former subsection seven, which imposed 
liability on any person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be 
made or used, a false record or statement to conceal, avoid, or decrease 
an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the 
Government.”104  The court declared that a false statement under this 
subsection of the FCA can only “avoid or decrease an obligation if that 
statement is material to the money or property owed to the 
Government.”105  Similar to the logic used in analyzing subsection two, 
one cannot decrease an obligation to the government unless the false 
statement used was material to the government in its decision-making 
process. 
                                                     
 100. Medshares Mgmt. Group, 400 F.3d at 443. 
 101. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Wilkins v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 601, 624 
(S.D. Tex. 2001)). 
 102. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).  After the 2009 amendments, this 
subsection imposes liability on a person who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, 
a false record or statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”  31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) 
(West Supp. 2009).  Congress removed the phrase “to get” to ensure that no intent element would be 
read into the statute.  S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 437–
38. 
 103. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 679 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 104. Medshares Mgmt. Group, 400 F.3d at 443 (quoting 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(7) (2000)).  After 
the 2009 amendments, this subsection imposes liability on a person who “knowingly makes, uses, or 
causes to be made or used, a false record or statement material to an obligation to pay or transmit 
money or property to the Government, or knowingly conceals or knowingly and improperly avoids 
or decreases an obligation to pay or transmit money or property to the Government.”  31 U.S.C.A. § 
3729(a)(1)(G) (West Supp. 2009). 
 105. Medshares Mgmt. Group, 400 F.3d at 443. 
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A district court also analyzed the literal language of the FCA in 
scholarly detail and arrived at the same conclusion.106  In its analysis, the 
court studiously considered the words of the statute, which led to 
the conclusion that the defendant’s statements or conduct that form the 
basis of an FCA complaint must result in a claim that is false or 
fraudulent.  Statements or conduct make a claim false only if they are 
material to the defendant’s entitlement to the money or property 
claimed.107 
The court concluded that 
[a] natural reading of the term “false or fraudulent claim” is consistent 
with the implied materiality requirement that the courts have 
consistently recognized.  By requiring a claim that is false or 
fraudulent, rather than a claim that contains false or fraudulent 
statements, the FCA implicitly requires statements or conduct that are 
material to the person’s entitlement to the money or property claimed 
before liability can arise.108 
Accordingly, under a common reading and the plain meaning of the 
statute, there is an implicit materiality element required in bringing a 
claim under § 3729(a)(1)(A) of the FCA.109 
b. The Second Step of the Wells Framework and the FCA 
The second step in the Wells framework is to analyze the common 
law meaning of the words within the statute.110  The Supreme Court has 
reasoned that “the common law could not have conceived of ‘fraud’ 
without proof of materiality.”111  For example, the Court in Neder v. 
United States applied the Wells framework112 to determine that 
materiality is a requirement for the crimes of mail fraud,113 wire fraud,114 
                                                     
 106. United States ex rel. Wilkins v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 601, 624–30 (S.D. 
Tex. 2001), abrogated by United States ex rel. Longhi v. United States, Nos. 08-20194 and 08-
20306, 2009 WL 1959259, at *7 (5th Cir. July 9, 2009). 
 107. Id. at 624. 
 108. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 109. Medshares Mgmt. Group, 400 F.3d at 443. 
 110. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 491 (1997). 
 111. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 (1999). 
 112. Id. at 20. 
 113. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006). 
 114. § 1343. 
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and bank fraud.115  These statutes, like the FCA prior to the 2009 
amendments, do not expressly require a showing of materiality.116  
However, “[i]t is a well-established rule of construction that ‘[w]here 
Congress uses terms that have accumulated settled meaning under . . . the 
common law, a court must infer, unless the statute otherwise dictates, 
that Congress means to incorporate the established meaning of these 
terms.’”117  Accordingly, the Court in its conclusion analyzed the term 
“fraud” and held that in using the term, Congress intended to 
“incorporate the ‘well-settled meaning at common law,’ which included 
proof of materiality.”118  In its decision, the Supreme Court declared, “we 
cannot infer from the absence of an express reference to materiality that 
Congress intended to drop that element from the fraud statutes.”119  In its 
conclusion, the Court stated “we must presume that Congress intended to 
incorporate materiality unless the statute otherwise dictates.”120  The 
same reasoning applies to the FCA—one must presume that Congress 
intended materiality to be an element unless the statute otherwise 
dictates.  Therefore, the common law requires an element of materiality 
under § 3729(a)(1)(A) of the FCA. 
c. The Third Step of the Wells Framework and the FCA 
The last step in the Wells framework is to analyze the statutory and 
legislative history.121  The Senate report regarding the 1986 amendments 
states that the FCA was amended “to provide that an individual who 
makes a material misrepresentation to avoid paying money owed the 
Government would be equally liable under the Act as if he had submitted 
a false claim to receive money.”122  Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit held 
that Congress implicitly required and intended materiality to be an 
element of an FCA claim.123 
                                                     
 115. § 1344. 
 116. See §§ 1341, 1343, 1344. 
 117. Neder, 527 U.S. at 21 (citing Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 322 
(1992)) (citations omitted). 
 118. Id. at 21–23. 
 119. Id. at 23. 
 120. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 
442 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing Neder, 527 U.S. at 23). 
 121. United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 492 (1997). 
 122. Medshares Mgmt. Group, 400 F.3d at 444 (quoting S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 18 (1986), 
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5283) (emphasis added). 
 123. Id. 
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An FCA claim brought under former 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) and (3) 
came before the Supreme Court in June 2008 in Allison Engine Co.124  
The Court held that 
[i]t is insufficient for a plaintiff asserting a § 3729(a)(2) claim to show 
merely that the false statement’s use resulted in payment or approval of 
the claim . . . .  Instead, such a plaintiff must prove that the defendant 
intended that the false statement be material to the Government’s 
decision to pay or approve the false claim.125 
Subsection three imposes liability on a person who “conspires to defraud 
the Government by getting a false or fraudulent claim allowed or 
paid.”126  Similarly under former § 3729(a)(3), the Court held that “it 
must be established that [the alleged conspirators] agreed that the 
statement would have a material effect on the Government’s decision to 
pay the false or fraudulent claim.”127  The Court reasoned that the 
absence of a requirement of materiality under the intent element “would 
expand the FCA well beyond its intended role of combating ‘fraud 
against the Government.’”128  Although Congress disagreed that the FCA 
should include an intent element, it did not discuss or analyze a 
requirement of materiality.129 
While the Court’s holding in Allison Engine Co. does not discuss 
whether materiality is an independent element of a § 3729(a)(1)(A) FCA 
claim or whether false statements must be material from the 
government’s point of view in its decision-making process, the Court’s 
logic can be equally applied to these issues.  Without an objective 
requirement of materiality under this subsection, the FCA would be 
expanded beyond its intended purpose.  Accordingly, by applying its 
logic in Allison Engine Co., it is clear that the Supreme Court would find 
that § 3729(a)(1)(A) of the FCA includes an element of materiality. 
Materiality is, therefore, implicitly required under § 3729(a)(1)(A) of 
the FCA.  A natural reading of the statute’s text supports the presence of 
a requirement of materiality, and Congress implied the element of 
materiality within the common law meaning of the word “fraud.”   
 
                                                     
 124. Allison Engine Co. v. United States ex rel. Sanders, 128 S. Ct. 2123, 2125 (2008). 
 125. Id. (emphasis added). 
 126. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(3) (2006), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 3279(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 
2009). 
 127. Allison Engine Co., 128 S. Ct. at 2125–26. 
 128. Id. at 2128. 
 129. See S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 437–38. 
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Without a requirement of materiality under § 3729(a)(1)(A), the FCA 
would be expanded beyond its original purpose intended by Congress. 
B. Circuits Are Split on the Test for Materiality in the Context of the 
FCA 
The Court has provided little guidance on the definition of 
materiality and no guidance with respect to the test for materiality under 
the FCA.130  In Neder v. United States, a federal mail fraud, wire fraud, 
and bank fraud case, the Court articulated a broad and general definition 
of materiality.131  “In general, a false statement is material if it has ‘a 
natural tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision 
of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.’”132  The 
Supreme Court adopted this general formulation of materiality “because 
the judgment in question [i.e. of materiality] does not lend itself to 
mechanical resolution.”133  Congress adopted this definition of “material” 
in § 3729(b)(4).134  Even though the Court and Congress have provided 
little guidance on an appropriate test for materiality under the FCA,135 the 
circuits have attempted to formulate a working test from the general 
definition provided in Neder.  However, the circuits currently disagree 
about what test should be used to determine materiality.  The Fourth,136 
Sixth,137 Ninth,138 and Tenth139 Circuits have all applied the natural 
tendency test, while the Second140 and Eighth141 Circuits have applied the 
outcome determinative test. 
                                                     
 130. See Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. (quoting United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)). 
 133. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 679 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(quoting Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 771 (1988)). 
 134. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(b)(4) (West Supp. 2009). 
 135. Although Congress cited the Sixth Circuit’s Medshares Management Group for support of 
this definition, it neither approved nor disapproved of use of the natural tendency test to determine 
materiality.  S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 12, n.6 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 439.  
Additionally, it also cited circuits that apply the outcome determinative test as support for the 
definition.  Id. 
 136. United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1459 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
 137. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 
444 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 138. United States v. Bourseau, 531 F.3d 1159, 1170 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 139. United States ex rel. Bahrani v. Conagra, Inc., 465 F.3d 1189, 1204 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 140. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 141. Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998). 
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1. Natural Tendency Test 
The name for this test stems from the definition of materiality 
provided by the Court in Neder.142  The courts essentially turned this 
vague statement—that a false statement is material if it has “a natural 
tendency to influence, or [is] capable of influencing, the decision of the 
decisionmaking body to which it was addressed”—into a standard by 
which materiality is determined under the FCA.143  Under the natural 
tendency test, courts should consider “whether the false statement has a 
natural tendency to influence agency action or is capable of influencing 
agency action.”144 
The Sixth Circuit in Medshares Management Group has probably 
provided the strongest assessment and analysis for using this test.145  The 
court declared that this standard “focuses on the potential effect of the 
false statement when it is made, not on the actual effect of the false 
statement when it is discovered”146 and is thus “more consistent with the 
plain meaning of the statute, which attaches liability upon presentment of 
a false or fraudulent claim, rather than actual payment on that claim.”147  
The court also reasoned that “liability under the FCA is punishable by a 
civil penalty in addition to any damages which the Government actually 
sustains, which reinforces the conclusion that the actual result is not 
dispositive of liability under the FCA.”148  Essentially, the court was 
using the logic that “there is no language in section 3729(a)(1) that 
mandates actual payment by the government or the need to establish 
damages.”149 
Additionally, the court declared that the natural tendency test is more 
consistent with the purpose of the FCA: 
                                                     
 142. Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 16 (1999). 
 143. Id. (quoting United States v. Gaudlin, 515 U.S. 506, 509 (1995)). 
 144. United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1460 (4th Cir. 
1997) (quoting United States v. Norris, 749 F.2d 1116, 1122 (4th Cir. 1984)). 
 145. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 
445–46 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 146. Id. at 445 (quoting United States ex rel. Harrison v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 352 
F.3d 908, 916–17 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
 147. Id. (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2006), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 3279(a)(1)(A) (West 
Supp. 2009)). 
 148. Id. at 446. 
 149. Brooker, supra note 38, at 394.  See also Joan H. Krause, Health Care Providers and the 
Public Fisc: Paradigms of Government Harm Under the Civil False Claims Act, 36 GA. L. REV. 
121, 163–64 (2001) (“The statutory language supports the view that proof of damages is not a 
prerequisite for suit under the FCA.”). 
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[E]valuating materiality based on the potential effect rather than actual 
result is more consistent with the underlying purpose of the FCA.  The 
United States Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the statute to 
cover all fraudulent attempts to cause the Government to pay out sums 
of money.  We have similarly held that recovery under the FCA is not 
dependent upon the government’s sustaining monetary damages.  These 
holdings are consistent with the FCA’s principal goal of ensuring the 
integrity of the Government’s dealings, which is embodied in the 
maxim that [m]en must turn square corners when they deal with the 
Government.150 
Therefore, the focus of the natural tendency test is on the potential effect 
of the false statement or claim rather than its actual effect. 
2. Outcome Determinative Test 
In contrast, some circuits apply the more restrictive outcome 
determinative test, which was derived from the text of the FCA.  This 
test “requires a showing that the alleged fraudulent actions had ‘the 
purpose and effect of causing the United States to pay out money it is not 
obligated to pay, or those actions which intentionally deprive the United 
States of money it is lawfully due.’”151  In applying this test, the Eighth 
Circuit has held that “where the plaintiff cannot show that the 
government agency would have acted differently had it known of the 
omission, ‘there is no false claim because [the agency’s action] would 
have occurred regardless of [the defendant’s] actions.’”152 
In coming to its conclusion, the Eighth Circuit looked to previous 
Supreme Court decisions analyzing the definition of “claim” under the 
FCA.153  In 1958, the Supreme Court indicated in United States v. 
McNinch, “that a ‘claim’ under the FCA is a ‘demand for money’ that 
induces the government to disburse funds or ‘otherwise suffer immediate 
financial detriment.’”154  Accordingly, the court concluded that 
only those actions by the claimant which have the purpose and effect of 
causing the United States to pay out money it is not obligated to pay, or 
those actions which intentionally deprive the United States of money it  
                                                     
 150. Medshares Mgmt. Group, 400 F.3d at 446 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 151. Id. at 445 (quoting Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998)). 
 152. Id. (quoting Rabushka ex rel. United States v. Crane Co., 122 F.3d 559, 563 (8th Cir. 
1997)). 
 153. Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998). 
 154. Id. (quoting United States v. McNinch, 356 U.S. 595, 599 (1958)). 
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is lawfully due, are properly considered “claims” within the meaning of 
the FCA.155 
Similarly, the Fifth Circuit applied the outcome determinative test to 
a claim under former 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2).156  It reasoned that this 
subsection of the FCA prohibits the submission of a false record or 
statement, but “it does so only when the submission of the record or 
statement was done in an attempt to get a false claim paid.  There is no 
liability under [the FCA] for a false statement unless it is used to get a 
false claim paid.”157  The court placed significant weight on the “express 
connection of a false statement with ‘getting’ a false claim paid” and 
declared it “tantamount to requiring that the false statement be material 
to the payment decision.”158  For this proposition, the court cited and 
based its reasoning on Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, which 
declares that the FCA “was not intended to impose liability for every 
false statement made to the government.”159  By using the outcome 
determinative test, the court held that “[i]t is only those claims for money 
or property to which a defendant is not entitled that are ‘false’ for 
purposes of the False Claims Act.”160 
IV. SUBSTANTIAL WEIGHT TEST PROPOSAL 
The Supreme Court has provided little guidance in interpreting the 
FCA and has seemingly contradicted itself regarding the definition of 
materiality and the purpose of the statute.  The problem has been 
exacerbated by lower courts’ difficulty in carefully reading the statute 
and applying the Supreme Court’s interpretations.  Because the status of 
the FCA in the courts is in such disarray, a unifying standard must be put 
in place to preserve the fraud deterrence purpose of the statute.  
Otherwise, as some have speculated, “Congress may be forced to once 
again enact amendments to the FCA in order to restore the [FCA] as a  
 
                                                     
 155. Id. (emphasis added). 
 156. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 675 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 679. 
 159. Id. at 675 (citing Hutchins v. Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, 253 F.3d 176, 184 (3d Cir. 
2001)). 
 160. Id. at 674–75 (citing Costner v. URS Consultants, Inc., 153 F.3d 667, 677 (8th Cir. 1998); 
United States ex rel. Wilkins v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 601, 626 (S.D. Tex. 2001)). 
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broad-based tool for combating fraud in federal programs and 
procurement.”161 
The lower courts’ confusion is inhibiting the statute’s effectiveness 
in fighting fraud against the government.  The courts need a simple test 
that is consistent with Congress’s objective in adopting the statute—to 
deter fraud and provide restitution to the government for its losses from 
false claims.  However, the test must not be so broad as to include trivial 
falsehoods that are outside the purview of the statute.  The test should be 
a substantial weight test: while the government need not actually have 
paid out on the false claim, the alleged false statement must be the type 
often considered by the government in the decision-making process, and 
its effect must be given substantial weight in the government’s decision 
with respect to payment of the claim. 
A. Congress Intended the FCA to Be Restitutionary 
The Senate Report accompanying the 1986 amendments to the FCA 
expressly stated that “[t]he purpose of [the amendments] is to enhance 
the Government’s ability to recover losses sustained as a result of fraud 
against the Government.”162  The Supreme Court has supported this 
purpose by indicating that “the [FCA’s] primary purpose is to indemnify 
the government—through its restitutionary penalty provisions—against 
losses caused by a defendant’s fraud.”163  The following excerpt from a 
Second Circuit case eloquently sets forth the underlying purpose of the 
statute. 
Since the Act is restitutionary and aimed at retrieving ill-begotten 
funds, it would be anomalous to find liability when the alleged 
noncompliance would not have influenced the government’s decision 
to pay.  Accordingly, while the Act is intended to reach all types of 
fraud, without qualification, that might result in financial loss to the 
Government, it does not encompass those instances of regulatory 
noncompliance that are irrelevant to the government’s disbursement 
decisions.164 
                                                     
 161. Brooker, supra note 38, at 400. 
 162. S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5266 (emphasis 
added). 
 163. Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 696 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing United States ex rel. Marcus v. 
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549, 551–52 (1943)). 
 164. Id. at 697 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
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Additionally, Congress described the FCA as a “tool used to recover 
funds lost to fraud and abuse,”165 and in no way described the Act as 
punitive.166  Because it is clear that the Act’s primary purpose is 
restitutionary, courts should not use it to punish all claimants who 
inadvertently make false statements that are irrelevant to the decision-
making entity in its decision-making process. 
B. The Natural Tendency and Outcome Determinative Tests Are Flawed 
and Inappropriately Applied By Some Courts 
While no judicially created test is without its shortcomings, the 
natural tendency and outcome determinative tests are seriously flawed.  
Courts are having difficulty applying the tests consistently among FCA 
violators.  The natural tendency test is far too broad, which could cause 
inconsistent outcomes among claims under the FCA.  It also imposes a 
more punitive aspect on claims under the FCA, despite the clear 
restitutionary purpose of the statute, by punishing claims that were not 
meant to be within the purview of the statute.  The outcome 
determinative test is too strict and severely weakens the fraud deterrent 
effect of the statute and ability of the government to protect its federal 
relief funds and assistance programs during this current economic crisis.  
Additionally, some courts professing to apply one test seem to use the 
requirements of the other. 
1. Natural Tendency Test 
A serious problem with the natural tendency test is that there is no 
standard by which to measure how influential the false claim or 
statement must be.  Any small error in the claim or in a statement could 
“potentially” affect the government’s decision to pay, but what is unclear 
is the level of potentiality the statement or claim must have before it is 
considered material.  The courts are silent on this issue, and Congress’s 
general definition of “material” provides no guidance.  Allowing such 
broad discretion could cause severe discrepancies between similar cases 
in front of different courts.  Even if both courts profess to apply the 
natural tendency test, one court may take the view that the claim did not 
have enough potential or “natural tendency to influence,” while another 
                                                     
 165. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 10 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 438. 
 166. Although the Senate Report cites Congress’s aims to punish and prevent fraud, these aims 
are confined to the criminal provisions FERA amends as opposed to the FCA’s civil provisions.  See 
id. at 6–15. 
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may find the opposite and impose liability under the FCA.  The disparate 
treatment of what constitutes fraud among circuits can lead to over-
deterrence of conduct that does not actually violate the FCA, especially 
in the current climate of hypersensitivity to fraud. 
By applying such a broad test for determining materiality, the natural 
tendency test sweeps in many false statements and claims that were not 
intended to be within the purview of the statute.  By requiring those 
submitting these claims to pay the $10,000-per-false-claim forfeiture, the 
courts are assigning a punitive aspect to the FCA that was not originally 
intended by Congress.  As articulated in the Sixth Circuit, these courts 
believe that when Congress increased the fine from $2000 to $10,000 
with the 1986 amendments, it implied that the statute was meant to be 
more punitive in nature.167  This assumption cannot be true.  A simple 
inflation calculation completely contradicts this notion.  Two thousand 
dollars in 1863 is equal to approximately $17,850 in 1986.168  This 
calculation actually leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to 
adjust the penalty for inflation and decrease the punitive effect of the 
civil penalties.  Additionally, in considering the 2009 amendments, 
Congress had the opportunity to raise the civil penalty but did not and 
merely provided an inflation adjustment provision.169 
Additionally, in unique cases under the natural tendency test, a 
person may be held liable and subject to $10,000 in civil penalties when 
the false claim had the effect of causing the government to underpay the 
person what he was owed.  This situation was discussed in the Fourth 
Circuit in United States ex rel. Schell v. Battle Creek Health System.170  
The court analyzed a hospital’s cost and billing methods for anesthesia 
provided to patients.171  The hospital received Medicare funds 
incrementally based upon cost estimates without regard to the billing 
methods.172  While the court found that the hospital’s method of billing 
patients could have constituted fraud on Medicare,173 the reports to 
Medicare only consisted of the cost of the medicine and not what had 
been billed to the patients.174  However, as Judge Cook pointed out in his 
dissent, “Medicare did not suffer damages—instead, Medicare underpaid 
                                                     
 167. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 
446 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 168. See The Inflation Calculator, http://www.westegg.com/inflation/ (last visited Oct. 1, 2009). 
 169. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(G) (West Supp. 2009). 
 170. 419 F.3d 535, 539 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 171. Id. at 536–37. 
 172. Id. at 537. 
 173. See id. at 540. 
 174. Id. at 538–39. 
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in its interim payments to [the hospital] . . . such that Medicare owed [the 
hospital] money ‘at the end of the day.’”175  In essence, the alleged 
violation did not harm the government; in fact, the government may have 
underpaid the Medicare costs of the defendant.176 
Circuits applying the natural tendency test have been imposing 
liability under the FCA as if it is a punitive statute.  To the contrary, the 
FCA was intended to be restitutionary, and the additional civil penalty of 
$10,000 was to ensure that the government was entirely reimbursed for 
its loss.177  These discrepancies and inconsistent outcomes regarding 
fraud under the FCA are undermining the aim of the FCA—to deter 
fraud against the government.  Additionally, these courts are attempting 
to convert the purpose of the statute from restitutionary to punitive in 
nature.  This strict punitive interpretation is not what the drafters of the 
FCA intended. 
2. Outcome Determinative Test 
There are also problems with the restrictive outcome determinative 
test.  While the purpose of the FCA is remedial in nature, “there is no 
language in [§] 3729(a)(1) that mandates actual payment by the 
government or the need to establish damages.”178  In fact, “[t]he statutory 
language supports the view that proof of damages is not a prerequisite for 
suit under the FCA.”179  Therefore, the outcome determinative test would 
not find a person liable who satisfies all the elements of the FCA if the 
government happened to catch the falsity before it paid the claim.  
Essentially then, this test puts substantial weight on the government’s 
actions to determine the materiality of the claim and not on the nature of 
the defendant’s statements or claims.  This situation also undermines the 
fraud deterrent aim of the FCA because of the potential inconsistent 
application of the statute. 
The outcome determinative test forces courts to apply the statute 
narrowly and restrictively, which decreases its deterrent effect and makes 
protection of government funds from fraud more difficult.  Additionally, 
                                                     
 175. Id. at 543 (Cook, J., dissenting).  An expert for Battle Creek concluded that the cost-to-
charge ratio by which Medicare was to pay Battle Creek barely changed through the 1990s and may 
have even caused Medicare to underpay Battle Creek.  This expert’s testimony was unchallenged by 
the plaintiff.  Id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. United States v. Bornstein, 423 U.S. 303, 314 (1976) (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus 
v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 551–52 (1943), superseded by statute, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006)). 
 178. Brooker, supra note 38, at 394 (emphasis added). 
 179. Krause, supra note 149, at 163–64. 
0.6.0_HOFFMAN FINAL 11/6/2009  1:13:21 PM 
204 KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58 
there cannot be a deterrent effect if what constitutes fraud is dependent 
solely on whether the government happens to catch the false claim or 
statement.  The 1986 amendments indicate that while the main purpose 
of the damages under the statute are remedial in nature, the treble 
damages impose a slight punitive aspect.  Based on the plain text of the 
statute, Congress meant for persons submitting false claims to be held 
liable, even if the government happens to catch the false claims before 
payment has been made.  The outcome determinative test is too 
restrictive to further the fraud deterrent purpose of the statute. 
3. Cross-Application of the Two Tests 
In addition to the fact that the natural tendency and outcome 
determinative tests are flawed, courts experience great difficulty in 
applying these tests to materiality under the FCA.  The circuits are 
confused about what the tests require and how to appropriately and 
consistently apply them.  Some courts professing to apply one test have 
seemingly applied the other. 
For example, the Fourth Circuit in applying the natural tendency test 
disallowed recovery because the false statements in question were not 
“central” to the funding decision by the governmental entity.180  In 
United States ex rel. Berge v. Board of Trustees of the University of 
Alabama, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants made false statements 
to the National Institutes of Health in their annual progress reports for 
grants.181  A government officer indicated that the false statements “were 
not central to UAB’s project and that the progress reported by UAB was 
satisfactory for a recommendation of continued funding without [the 
false statements].”182  Therefore, the court held that the false statements 
were not material.183  Because the court looked at whether the statements 
were “central” to the government’s decision to pay the claim and at 
whether the claim would have been paid without the statements, the court 
was trying to determine if the false statements would have affected the 
outcome or the government’s decision to pay.  If the court were truly 
applying the natural tendency test, it would be analyzing whether the 
false statements had the potential to affect the decision of the 
government, not whether the statements actually affected the outcome.  
                                                     
 180. United States ex rel. Berge v. Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala., 104 F.3d 1453, 1460 (4th Cir. 
1997). 
 181. Id. at 1456. 
 182. Id. at 1460. 
 183. Id. 
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The uncertainty of what test courts will apply only exacerbates the 
problem that the FCA is not consistently applied and further undermines 
the fraud deterrent purpose of the statute. 
While no judicial test is perfect, especially one for a vague and 
elusive concept like materiality, the natural tendency and outcome 
determinative tests are failing to further the purpose of the statute.  
Instead, these tests are actually undermining the statute’s aims of 
protecting government funds from fraud and abuse and deterring fraud.  
Additionally, in the current economic climate where financial fraud is 
constantly in the limelight and deterrence is a very important tool, it is 
critical that courts apply a unified standard.  The courts need a test that is 
consistent with Congressional intent, furthers the purposes of the FCA, 
and can be more consistently applied in all courts across the country. 
C. The Test for Materiality Under the FCA Should Be the Substantial 
Weight Test 
Because the natural tendency test is too broad and the outcome 
determinative test is too restrictive, courts need a test that balances the 
remedial and punitive aspects of the FCA.  The courts should apply a 
substantial weight test for materiality under the FCA.  Because the 
statute provides for a civil penalty in addition to damages, the 
government need not actually suffer damages for a defendant to incur 
liability under the FCA.  However, the false claim or statement must be 
given substantial weight by the governmental decision-making entity—it 
must be one that the government typically considers when making 
decisions to pay similar claims.  If the false statement or claim is trivial 
and is not given substantial weight in the decision-making process, it is 
outside the purview of the statute, and the claimant cannot incur liability 
under the FCA.  The Supreme Court has developed a similar test for 
materiality under different statutes.  Additionally, the text and purpose of 
the statute supports such a test. 
1. The Supreme Court Supports the Substantial Weight Test in Other 
Legal Contexts 
A test similar to the substantial weight test for materiality is used in 
the context of torts.  The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides a 
general definition of materiality and advises that a matter is material if 
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or 
nonexistence in determining his choice of action in the transaction in 
question; or (b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to 
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know that its recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as 
important in determining his choice of action, although a reasonable 
man would not so regard it.184 
The Restatement definition, among several other tests, has been applied 
by the Third Circuit in analyzing whether a statement was material in the 
context of the FCA.185  The circuit cited Neder as authority for using the 
definition.186 
The Supreme Court in Kungys v. United States considered a test 
bearing significant similarities to the proposed substantial weight test 
under a denaturalization statute.187  Four Justices found “Kungys’s 
misstatements of his date and place of birth on his naturalization 
application not material because those statements were neither relevant 
to citizenship qualifications nor, if correctly reported, would they have 
led to other facts relevant to qualifications for citizenship.”188  The 
Court’s analysis is similar to the substantial weight test because it 
considers whether the misstatements would be given any weight by the 
naturalization board in its decision regarding Kungys’s citizenship 
qualifications. 
The Supreme Court’s decision in TSC Industries, Inc., v. Northway, 
Inc. lends even stronger support for the use of the substantial weight test 
for determining materiality under the FCA.189  The Court considered the 
definition of “material” under the proxy rules under the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.190  The proxy rules under this Act bar the use of 
“proxy statements that are false or misleading with respect to the 
presentation or omission of material facts.”191  The Court stated that the 
question of materiality is “an objective one, involving the significance of 
an omitted or misrepresented fact . . . .”192  It also recognized that the 
rule’s “broad remedial purpose” was important in formulating a standard 
of materiality.193  The Court considered a test that was adopted by the 
                                                     
 184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1977). 
 185. United States ex rel. Cantekin v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 192 F.3d 402, 415–16 (3d Cir. 1999). 
 186. Id. (citing Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 22 n.5 (1999) (quoting RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 538)). 
 187. 485 U.S. 759, 770–71 (1988). 
 188. Id. at 774; United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 679 (5th Cir. 2003) (en 
banc) (also discussing the effect of the Court’s treatment of this misstatement on the Court’s 
treatment of a similar misstatement under the FCA). 
 189. 426 U.S. 438, 448–49 (1976). 
 190. Id. at 440. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 445. 
 193. Id. at 448. 
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Court of Appeals, which found a statement to be material if a reasonable 
shareholder might consider it important.194  It criticized that “the ‘might’ 
formulation is ‘too suggestive of mere possibility, however unlikely.’”195  
Accordingly, the Court formulated the following test: “An omitted fact is 
material if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder 
would consider it important in deciding how to vote.”196  The Court 
further explained that the standard contemplates a showing of 
a substantial likelihood that, under all the circumstances, the omitted 
fact would have assumed actual significance in the deliberations of the 
reasonable shareholder.  Put another way, there must be a substantial 
likelihood that the disclosure of the omitted fact would have been 
viewed by the reasonable investor as having significantly altered the 
“total mix” of information made available.197 
In formulating this test for materiality, the Court considered the balance 
between “the need to insure adequate disclosure and the need to avoid 
the adverse consequences of setting too low a threshold for civil 
liability.”198  In later decisions, the Supreme Court adopted this 
materiality formulation in numerous other securities contexts.199 
Because materiality in the context of securities and in the context of 
the FCA both deal with fraud under a federal statute, the careful 
consideration by the Supreme Court in TSC Industries of the purpose of 
the securities statute and the weakness of other tests applies equally to 
the FCA.  Even though the FCA has a broad remedial purpose, the 
Supreme Court would likely criticize the natural tendency test as “too 
suggestive of mere possibility” as it did in TSC Industries.  Instead, the 
materiality requirement under the FCA permits courts to carefully 
balance the need to deter fraud and ensure the claims are truthful and 
legitimate against the adverse consequences of setting civil liability too 
low and punishing those defendants whose actions are not within the 
purview of the statute.  Finding liability under the FCA when false 
statements or claims are given substantial weight in the decision-making 
process serves to balance these competing interests and further the 
remedial purpose of the statute. 
                                                     
 194. Id. at 449. 
 195. Id. (quoting Gerstle v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 478 F.2d 1281, 1302 (2d Cir. 1973)). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. (footnote omitted). 
 198. Id. at 449 n.10. 
 199. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 232 (1988) (adopting the TSC Industries 
standard in the context of § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934). 
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2. A Plain Reading of the Text and the Purpose of the FCA Support the 
Substantial Weight Test 
To tailor the test for materiality to the FCA, it is important to look to 
the text of the statute.  The FCA imposes liability upon a person who 
“knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or used, a false record or 
statement material to a false or fraudulent claim.”200  Although the phrase 
“to get” was written out of the statute with the 2009 amendments, 
Congress’s reasoning for doing so was to ensure that courts would not 
interpret “to get” as an intent element rather than to help define the test 
for materiality.201  As a result, it is useful to look at the prior phrasing of 
the Act to ascertain what Congress meant in drafting the statute and to 
determine the purpose implied in the text. 
Prior to the 2009 amendments, one subsection of the FCA imposed 
liability on anyone who “knowingly makes, uses, or causes to be made or 
used, a false record or statement to get a false or fraudulent claim paid or 
approved by the Government.”202  Completely setting aside the issue of 
intent, courts used the phrase “to get” to interpret a materiality 
requirement.203  The reasoning was that the use of a false statement could 
only serve to induce the government to disburse money if it was material 
to the claim.204  Thus, liability under the FCA does not arise only because 
the claim includes a false statement, but “the claim itself must be false or 
fraudulent.”205  “A false statement within a claim can only serve to make 
the entire claim itself fraudulent if that statement is material to the 
request or demand for money or property.”206  A statement cannot be 
material to the request or demand for money or property unless it is one 
that is given significant weight in the decision-making process by the 
governmental entity or contractor. 
                                                     
 200. 31 U.S.C.A. § 3729(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2009). 
 201. S. REP. NO. 111-10, at 13 (2009), reprinted in 2009 U.S.C.C.A.N. 430, 440–41. 
 202. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(2) (2006), amended by 31 U.S.C.A. § 3279(a)(1)(B) (West Supp. 
2009).  Congress removed the phrase “paid or approved by the Government” to prevent courts from 
interpreting the statute to require direct governmental involvement as opposed to indirect use of 
governmental funds, and  not whether the claim must actually be paid to be considered material.  S. 
REP. NO. 111-10, at 12 (2009). 
 203. See supra Part III.A.1.a; see, e.g., United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 
679 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 204. Id. 
 205. United States ex rel. A+ Homecare, Inc. v. Medshares Mgmt. Group, Inc., 400 F.3d 428, 
443 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 206. Id. (citing United States ex rel. Wilkins v. N. Am. Constr. Corp., 173 F. Supp. 2d 601, 624 
(S.D. Tex. 2001)). 
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Essentially then, under the FCA, a person cannot submit a record or 
statement material to a claim unless the statement is clearly one typically 
considered by the governmental entity in determining which claims to 
pay.  Therefore, to further the broad remedial purpose of the statute and 
to maintain consistency with how the Supreme Court has interpreted the 
FCA, the test for materiality should be the substantial weight test. 
While the proponents of the outcome determinative test may criticize 
the substantial weight test as more difficult to apply, the Supreme Court 
has declared that “ease of application alone is not an excuse for ignoring 
the purposes of [statutes] and Congress’ policy decisions.”207  
Additionally, because the “determination of materiality is context-
specific and sensitive to what the government accomplishes by means of 
[enforcing the statute],”208 the test must provide flexibility to different 
situations.  The substantial weight test provides this flexibility by 
allowing courts to perform a case-by-case analysis of whether the false 
claim or statement is one that would typically be given substantial weight 
in the governmental entity’s decision-making process. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The current status of materiality within the context of the FCA could 
force Congress to once again clarify the purpose and amend the statute.  
For congressional economy, the courts should apply the substantial 
weight test.  While the government need not actually have paid out on 
the false claim, the alleged false statement must be the type often 
considered by the government in the decision-making process, and its 
effect must be given substantial weight in the government’s decision to 
pay the claim.  This test is consistent with the general definition set forth 
by the Supreme Court in Neder and with the purpose of the FCA as set 
forth in the legislative history.  Courts would be able to apply this test for 
materiality more uniformly and, thus, the FCA would be interpreted 
more consistently by different courts, which would increase the fraud 
deterrent effect of the FCA.  The substantial weight test would more 
effectively further the underlying purposes of the FCA. 
                                                     
 207. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 236 (1988). 
 208. United States v. Southland Mgmt. Corp., 326 F.3d 669, 679 (5th Cir. 2003) (en banc) 
(Jones, J., concurring). 
